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INTRODUCTION
United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia has be-
come an important figure in American constitutional law. Over the
past five years, he has worked significant changes in our legal
landscape. He has argued-with a good deal of success-for a
markedly different view of the Supreme Court's power to assure
"substantive due process."' He has convinced his colleagues to
dramatically curb the reach of the Free Exercise Clause.' He has
pushed for a major alteration in the Court's Commerce Clause
analysis3 and reined in aspects of the commercial speech doc-
trine.4 Last Term, in the hate speech case from Minnesota, he
introduced what may prove to be a significantly altered approach
to free speech jurisprudence.5 His powerful minority opinions in
t Dean and Professor of Law, University of Colorado. This Article is based on
remarks presented at a symposium on Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife held at Duke Uni-
versity School of Law on January 21, 1993.
1. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 121-32 (1989); see also Cruzan v. Direc-
tor, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
2. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990).
3. See Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 254
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Richard B. Collins,
Justice Scalia and the Elusive Idea of Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce, 20 N.M.
L. REv. 555 (1990).
4. Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
5. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
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abortion,6 desegregation,7 and separation of powers' cases may
achieve broader influence in time.
Not surprisingly, Justice Scalia's federal courts opinions have
received less attention, but here, too, his efforts have been sub-
stantial. He has altered the breadth of federal common law,9 re-jected the Court's broad implied cause of action doctrine, l° devel-
oped a narrowed view of pendent jurisdiction,1' advocated further
restrictions on habeas corpus,12 and won over several colleagues
to his vision of the Eleventh Amendment. 3
Yet, Justice Scalia's most important opinion in federal courts
law is his most recent one-last summer's decision in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife. 4 This ruling, in my view, will mark a
transformation in the law of standing-the law of "judicial control
of public officers."15 Building upon his prior academic writings16
and opinions as both a Justice 7 and a federal appellate court
judge, 8 Scalia concluded for the Defenders majority-without
apparent embarrassment-that "legislatively pronounced" "public
rights" cannot provide the basis for standing in the federal courts
unless they coincide with the Justices' views of discrete, concrete,
and tangible injury. 9 The decision is difficult to square with the
language and history of Article III, with the injury requirement
6. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2873 (1992)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
7. See United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727, 2746 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
8. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
9. See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
10. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 188 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment).
11. See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989); see also Wendy C. Perdue,
Finley v. United States.: Unstringing Pendent Jurisdiction, 76 VA. L. REV. 539, 572 (1990).
12. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 350 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
13. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 29 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Ken-
nedy joined Scalia's opinion in Union Gas Co.
14. 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
15. Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 459 (1965).
16. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983).
17. See, eg., Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
18. See, e.g., Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 793
F.2d 1322, 1341-45 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
19. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2142-46.
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itself, with more modest visions of judicial power, and with time-
honored notions of public law litigation. It is, therefore, worthy of
some exploration and even some criticism. In this brief Article, I
will attempt to provide a measure of each.
I. LUJAN V. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE
The Endangered Species Act (the Act) requires the Secretary
of the Interior to initiate consultation processes when federally
funded projects or agency actions threaten the continued existence
of any endangered plant or animal species. In 1986, the Depart-
ment of the Interior revised its regulations, reinterpreting the
statute to require consultation only for actions taken in the United
States or on the high seas.2' Defenders involved a challenge to
this more geographically restricted rule.
The plaintiff, an environmental group, sought standing pursu-
ant to several theories. At least two group members identified
federally funded foreign projects that threatened endangered spe-
cies of particular interest to them. One alleged that she had trav-
elled to Sri Lanka and "'observed th[e] habitat' of . . . 'the Asian
elephant and the leopard,'"" which was jeopardized by the
Mahaweli Project funded by the Agency for International Devel-
opment. The other, who allegedly had "'observed the traditional
habitat of the ... nile crocodile ... and intend[s] to do so
again,"'" complained of American funding and overseeing of the
reconstruction of the Aswan Dam in Egypt.
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, easily concluded that
these allegations fell short of the "imminent injury" required for
standing.24 The affiants' profession of an intent to return to the
places they had visited before, without "concrete plans" or "any
specification," was-jurisdictionally speaking-"simply not
enough."'  "'[S]ome day' intentions," Scalia wrote, "do not sup-
port a finding of. . . 'actual or imminent' injury that our cases
require. ' '26
20. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988).
21. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2135.
22. Id. at 2138 (citing Affidavit of Amy Skilbred).
23. Id. (citing Affidavit of Joyce Kelly).
24. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990).
25. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2138.
26. Id. (quoting Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155). The plaintiffs also sought to demonstrate
11431993l
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Unwilling to stop there, Justice Scalia also determined that
the plaintiff failed to meet the redressability standard. Its short-
comings were twofold. First, the plaintiff had sued the Secretary of
the Interior, not the agencies providing funding for the contested
projects. If the Secretary were ordered to revise the disputed
regulation to require consultation, it was "very much an open
question" whether other agencies would be "bound" to comply.27
Second, the Court indicated that federal agencies typically supplied
only a "fraction" of the funding for foreign projects-ten percent
in the case of the Mahaweli Project.' Accordingly, the plaintiff
had produced nothing "to indicate that the projects ... named
will either be suspended, or do less harm ... if that fraction is
eliminated."29
These harsh sorts of injury and redressability" determina-
tions, as I will discuss below, are debilitating to much public law
litigation which is, by nature, predictive, probabilistic, and policy-
based. They also appear to begrudge the policies of the Act.
Whatever else may be said of the Court's standing determination
in Defenders, however, it was not surprising. In the past fifteen
years, the Court repeatedly has applied the injury, causation, and
injury as users of a "contiguous ecosystem." Id. at 2139. The Court found that this argu-
ment was inconsistent with National Wildlife's requirement that environmental plaintiffs
"must use the area affected by the challenged activity and not an area roughly 'in the
vicinity' of it." Id. (quoting National Wildlife, 497 U.S. at 887-89). Plaintiffs also claimed
standing under an "animal nexus" theory, arguing that anyone who has an interest in
studying or seeing endangered animals "anywhere on the globe" has standing. Id. Justice
Scalia dismissed this claim as "beyond all reason." Id.
27. Id. at 2140.
28. Id. at 2142.
29. Id. The Court concluded that since funding is frequently only partial, the loss of
any funding is not a large enough incentive to guarantee that agencies would make
changes to protect species. Justice Scalia may be skeptical about the relationship between
funding and behavior, but the Endangered Species Act does not seem to be. See 16
U.S.C. § 1535(d) (1988).
30. The Defenders opinion employs unreasonably demanding redressability standards.
It is possible, of course, that other government agencies would not consider themselves
"bound" by a regulation that demanded consultation, but surely consultation would be
highly likely if such a change in regulations occurred. This demand for certainty about
the success of remedies is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision to hear other
cases. For example, in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), the Court could not
have been any more certain that President Nixon would have complied with an order to
release the White House tapes than the Defenders Court was certain that other agencies
would comply with a directive of the Secretary of the Interior. Despite this uncertainty,
the Court heard Nixon.
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redressability standards with skepticism and even recalcitrance.
The Court has tightly cabined injury,3' employed causation to
reject apparent congressional policies,32 and interpreted redress-
ability to demand near certainty in remedial success.3
Justice Scalia's next step in Defenders, however, was new.
Despite the "thin" nature of the plaintiff's traditional injury claims
in Defenders, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
granted standing based upon the provisions of the Endangered
Species Act.' The statute, after all, makes clear that "any person
may commence a civil suit on his own behalf ... to enjoin...
[the] violation of any.., provision of [the Act]. '35 The district
courts also are empowered to "enforce any provision" or "order
the Secretary to perform [any] duty" prescribed by the statute.36
The lower court characterized interagency consultation, which is
required by section 7, as a legally cognizable "procedural right."37
Since Congress can clearly create new legal interests, the violation
of which constitutes injury in fact, the court of appeals inferred
that standing was appropriate.
31. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (rejecting exclusionary zoning
challenge for lack of standing). In Warth, the Court narrowly characterized the plaintiff's
injury claim as actually obtaining housing, rather than as a broader interest being given
the opportunity to obtain housing (which would have been redressable). Id. at 502-08.
The Court also refused to consider the plaintiff's alleged "interests in interracial associa-
tion" as capable of sustaining "injury in fact." Id. at 512-14.
32. Se4 e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (finding
insufficient link between congressional policy of allowing tax deductions -for charitable
hospitals and indigent plaintiff's desire for free emergency medical care). The Simon
Court assumed, in effect, that tax deductions are unlikely to affect private behavior. Id.
at 42-44. Congress seems to assume the opposite. See McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F.
Supp. 448, 456 (D.D.C. 1972); see also Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Causation as a Standing
Requirement: The Unprincipled Use of Judicial Restraint, 69 KY. L.i. 185, 203-04
(1980-1981).
33. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757-59 (1984) (finding that requiring the IRS
to lift tax-exempt status from racially discriminatory private schools may not achieve
desired goal of public school desegregation); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A
Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 656-57 (1985).
34. Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117, 121-22 (8th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112
S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
35. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988).
36. Id.
37. Id.; see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2142 (1992); 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(a)(2) (1988).
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Justice Scalia characterized the Eighth Circuit's holding as
"remarkable."'  The court based standing upon the mere congres-
sional conferral upon "all persons of an abstract, self-contained,
non-instrumental 'right."' 39 As in the Court's generalized griev-
ance cases, the interests asserted were "plainly undifferentiated
and common to all members of the public." 4 Those cases, of
course, involved violations of procedures set forth in the Constitu-
tion. There is, however, Scalia suggested, "absolutely no basis for
making the Article III inquiry turn on the source of the asserted
right., 41 If the courts were to "ignor[e]," at the "invitation of
Congress," the "concrete injury requirement," they would violate
the case or controversy requirement just as surely as if they had
granted standing without a constitutional, common law, or statuto-
ry basis.42 Although Congress may broaden the categories of "de
facto injuries, 43 that are judicially cognizable, it may not com-
pletely abandon the injury requirement. Accordingly, the plaintiff's
challenge was dismissed.
Defenders, therefore, took what to many will seem a surpris-
ing turn. The U.S. Supreme Court, for the first time in modern
Article III analysis,' concluded that even though a federal stat-
38. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2142.
39. Id. at 2143. It is worthy of comment that in Defenders, Justice Scalia once again
speaks in highly derogatory terms both of the plaintiffs claims and of his dissenting
colleagues. See Collins, supra note 3, at 555 & n.2 (cataloging colorful Scalia rebuttals).
In Defenders, Justice Scalia characterized the plaintiffs arguments as "inelegantly styled,"
"fantasy," "remarkable," and the results of a "Linnaean leap." 112 S. Ct. at 2139, 2140,
2142, 2140. His opponents on the Court, on the other hand, "continue to miss the point"
with "facially impracticable suggestion[s]." Id. at 2141 nA, 2142; see also Lee v. Weisman,
112 S. Ct. 2649, 2681, 2682 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing majority's claims as
"nothing short of ludicrous" and "beyond the absurd"); American Nat'l Red Cross v.
S.G. & A.E., 112 S. Ct. 2465, 2476 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (calling Justice Souter's
opinion for the majority "a wonderland of linguistic confusion"); Webster v. Reproductive
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532, 537 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that Justice
O'Connor's opinion "cannot be taken seriously" and is "irrational"). One wonders what
Justice Scalia's reaction would have been if the plaintiff in Defenders had suggested, as
he did, the recognition of, "alas," an "abstract, self-contained, non-instrumental right."
Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2139, 2143.
40. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2144 (quoting United Statds v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166,
177 (1974)).
41. Id. at 2144.
42. ld
43. Id. at 2145.
44. But see Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911) (dismissing case involving
statute in which Congress gave certain persons the capacity to sue the United States).
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ute sought to bestow standing upon a potential plaintiff, such a
grant of jurisdiction violated the strictures of the case or contro-
versy requirement. A clear statutory expression of authority-to
"any person"-fell before the notoriously amorphous demand for
a constitutional "case." To be sure, the Court has long held that
the congressional power to create standing was, at least in theory,
subject to the limitations of Article III." Paradoxically, however,
the Court had consistently accepted intangible and widely shared
statutory injuries as the basis for jurisdiction' and has asserted
that the "injury required by Article III may exist solely by virtue
of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates
standing."'47 Justice Scalia ruled, however, that the Act's broad-
based standing scheme relied on injuries that simply do not pass
constitutional muster.
If the Defenders holding is new to Article III jurisprudence, it
is certainly not new to Justice Scalia. In a much noted 1983 lec-
ture published in the Suffolk University Law Review, then-judge
Scalia argued that liberalized modem standing law had resulted in
the "ovejudicialization of the processes of [American] gover-
nance." Accordingly, he urged, the distinct and palpable injury
standard should be used not only to limit the justiciability of gen-
eralized constitutional claims, but also to curb the power of Con-
gress to grant standing. The law of standing, Scalia wrote, should
be employed to "restrict[] courts to their traditional undemocratic
role of protecting ... minorities against impositions of the majori-
ty, and [to] exclude[] them from the even more undemocratic role
of prescribing how the other two branches should function in
order to serve the interest of the majority itself." '49 Even the cre-
ation of "concrete" statutory rights, therefore, might not "suffice
to mark out a subgroup of the body politic requiring judicial pro-
tection."5 Citing an administrative law decision from 194451 that
45. See e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410
U.S. 614 (1973).
46. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) (recognizing
standing under the 1968 Civil Rights Act for injury to plaintiffs' interest in interracial
association). But cf. Warth, 422 U.S. at 500-10 (refusing to recognize interests in interra-
cial association as the basis for standing in a non-statutory case).
47. Warth, 422 U.S. at 500 (quoting Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 617 n.3), cited in De-
fenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2145.
48. Scalia, supra note 16, at 881.
49. Id. at 894 (emphasis omitted).
50. Id. at 895-96.
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would later appear as authority in the Defenders opinion,52 Scalia
concluded that the "core" requirement of particularized harm
should provide a consistent limitation "upon the congressional
power to confer standing. 5 3
While he remained a member of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, Scalia could set forth his
theory only in dissent;54 in Defenders, he carried the day in our
highest tribunal. As I will argue below, he may have significantly,
and without justification, altered the law of standing in the pro-
cess.
II. STATUTORY STANDING AND THE
CASE OR CONTROVERSY REQUIREMENT
The Endangered Species Act sets up a scheme of interagency
consultation designed to "provide a means whereby the ecosystems
upon which endangered species . . . depend may be con-
served ... ."' The Act overtly fosters a "policy of Congress that
all Federal departments and agencies shall seek to conserve en-
dangered species . . ,5" To guarantee compliance, the statute
indicates that "any person may commence a civil suit on his own
behalf," to "enforce any.., provision ... or to order the Secre-
tary to perform [a] duty" set forth in the Act.57
According to the Court in Defenders, there were at least two
problems with the plaintiff's attempts to secure statutory standing.
First, the asserted denial of "consultation" was not a "concrete"
injury. It was, rather, a "procedural" interest which Justice Scalia
characterized as "abstract, self-contained, [and] non-instrumen-
51. Id. at 883-84 (citing Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 (1944)).
52. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2145 (1992).
53. Scalia, supra note 16, at 886.
54. For example, in Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway, Traffic Safety
Admin., 793 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1986), then-Judge Scalia dissented from a ruling grant-
ing standing for consumer organizations to challenge fuel economy standards. Judge Harry
Edwards, writing for the majority, stated that "ft]he question of how many suffer from
an injury is logically unrelated to the question of whether there is an injury." Id. at 1334
(emphasis omitted). Judge Scalia disagreed, arguing that "the question whether there is
adequate reason for late issuance of light-truck fuel economy standards is of interest only
to the society at large, and should be resolved through the political mechanisms by
which ... society acts." Id. at 1345 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
55. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (1988).
56. Id.
57. Id. § 1540(g).
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tal."' 5' The Defenders majority clearly concluded that the
plaintiffs asserted statutory interests did not constitute a basis for
real, solid, concrete harms.
The second deficiency announced was that the plaintiff's inju-
ries were not "distinct." As in the constitutional generalized griev-
ance cases,59 the plaintiff sought relief that "no more directly and
tangibly benefits [it] than it does the public at large."'  Because,
quoting Marbury, "[tihe province of the court is, solely, to decide
on the rights of individuals,"61 entertaining the plaintiff's claims
would be "discarding a principle fundamental to the separate and
distinct constitutional role" of the courts.62
Additionally, Justice Scalia distinguished the repeated state-
ments in Article III cases that "the injury required ... may exist
solely by virtue of 'statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of
which creates standing.' ,61 Statutory standing cases like
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.' and Havens Real-
ty Corp. v. Coleman' entailed the recognition of de facto injuries
"that were previously inadequate in law."' This acceptance, in
Justice Scalia's view, represents the mere "broadening [of] the
categories of injury that may be alleged in support of standing,"
not the elimination of the requirement of injury altogether.67
The Article III framework which the Court relied on in De-
fenders to limit the reach of statutory standing carries a number of
both explicit and implicit assumptions. The first, drawing heavily
upon a private rights litigation model, is the belief that individual
injury is the "core" element, or "irreducible minimum"' of a
58. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2143 (1992). At the very least,
the "non-instrumental" part of the Court's description is perplexing. It is not easy to con-
clude that Act's consultation procedures are not meant to accomplish something.
59. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982); Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937).
60. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2143.
61. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
62. Defenders, 112 S. CL at 2144-45.
63. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410
U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973)).
64. 409 U.S. 205 (1972) (recognizing standing under the 1968 Civil Rights Act for
injury to interest in interracial association).
65. 455 U.S. 363, 373-75 (1982) (recognizing standing of person trying to test the
1968 Civil Rights Act).
66. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2145.
67. Id at 2145-46 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
68. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
11491993]
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constitutional case. Second, building upon that notion, Justice
Scalia assumes that there exists an identifiable class of de facto
injuries which constitute the appropriate outer limit of judicial
cognizance. Third, the Defenders opinion concludes that the judi-
ciary should play no role in the protection of shared or majority
"rights" or "policies." Enforcement of the "public interest" is the
job of the executive branch; allowing private citizens to pursue
such "public rights" threatens our "common understandings" of
judicial power.
III. INJURY AND ARTICLE III
The constitutional barrier to standing relied on in Defenders is
Article III's "case or controversy" requirement. As has been much
noted, the Framers gave almost no indication of what the phrase
meant. Probably assuming some sort of general understanding of
the power of the federal courts, James Madison referred only to
the limitation that tribunals deal with matters of "a Judiciary na-
ture., 69 Beyond this obviously circular assertion, the debates of
the Constitutional Congress reveal little to assist modern constitu-
tional interpretation.70
John Jay, the first Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court,
refused to answer questions presented by Secretary of State Thom-
as Jefferson concerning the legality of treaties, because the ques-
tions were submitted "extrajudicially. ' '71 In addition, in 1792, the
Supreme Court refused to play an administrative role in veterans'
disability determinations which were "not judicial, nor directed to
be performed judicially."'  These limited examples serve to bol-
ster only the general (and again somewhat circular) claim, trace-
State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
69. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 430 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911).
70. In The Federalist, Madison explicitly recognized the difficulty of differentiating
between the branches, noting that "no skill in the science of government has yet been
able to discriminate and define . . . its three great provinces-the legislative, executive,
or judiciary . . . ." Instead, "obscurity . . . reigns ...which puzzle[s] the greatest adepts
in political science." THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 228 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
71. Letter from John Jay to George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793), in 3 THE CORRE-
SPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 488-89 (Henry P. Johnston ed., 1891).
72. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408, 410 n.2 (1792).
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able to Osborn v. Bank of United States, a that legal actions must
"assume such a form that the judicial power is capable of acting
on [them]."'74 "Cases," then, must be reduced to concrete factual
applications and not subject to direct supervision or revision by
the political branches. They must employ existing legal mecha-
nisms as well, although, since Osborn itself changed the "legal
forms" of its day by permitting expanded injunctive relief against
state officers charged with violating the U.S. Constitution, this
limitation may mean less than it suggests.7'
It is not surprising that, as good originalists, we have turned,
with Justice Frankfurter, to "the business of the Colonial courts
and the courts of Westminster when the Constitution was
framed."76 Here, a great deal of work on the relevance of indi-
vidual injury has been done-although, at least by immediate
instrumentalist standards, it would have to be judged as some of
the most ineffective work in academic history. In separate, major,
and compelling efforts, Louis Jaffe in 1965, 7 Raoul Berger in
1969,78 and Steven Winter in 198879 have demonstrated that in-
jury was not a requisite for judicial authority in either the colo-
nial, framing, or early constitutional periods. The Judiciary Act of
1789, like several contemporaneous state statutes, allowed "inform-
er" actions.' English practice included prerogative writs, manda-
mus, certiorari, and prohibition, all designed to "restrain unlawful
oi abusive action by lower courts or public agencies," and re-
quiring only "neglect of justice," not individual injury."' Stranger
73. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
74. Id. at 819.
75. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Moot Cases, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Supreme
Court, 22 CoNN. L REv. 703, 715-17 (1990).
76. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
77. JAFFE, supra note 15, at 462-67.
78. Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It A Constitutional Require-
ment?, 78 YALE LJ. 816, 837-40 (1969).
79. Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of.Self-Governance,
40 STAN. L REV. 1371 (1988). "The public rights model coexisted comfortably with the
conceptual system of 19th century legal thought." Id. at 1409.
80. ld. at 1406-07.
81. Id. at 1397. See generally Union Pac. R.R. v. Hall, 91 U.S. 343, 354-55 (1875)
("There is . . . a decided preponderance of American authority in favor of the doctrine
that private persons may move for a mandamus to enforce a public duty" with "no inter-
est other than such as belonged to others .... ).
115119931
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suits and relator practice countenanced the assertion of judicial
power without the existence of a direct personal stake in the con-
troversy.' 2
More recently, Professor Caminker has explored the history of
the related qui tam action in which a plaintiff is allowed to bring
suit on behalf of the government with no interest in the contro-
versy other than the "bounty" created by statute. Caminker dem-
onstrates that qui tam suits have enjoyed a long and unmolested
history in the United States.s In recent months, Cass Sunstein
has plowed these same furrows extensively, even if not very origi-
nally, to conclude that "early English and American practices give
no support to the view" that Article III demands injury.' Surely,
the answer to Raoul Berger's historically based, titular ques-
tion-"Is [Injury] a Constitutional Requirement? "-remains an
emphatic "no."'  It is not surprising, then, that in 1968, one of
the most respected jurists of the post-World War II era, John
Marshall Harlan, would write that it is "clear that non-Hohfeldian
plaintiffs as such are not constitutionally excluded from the federal
courts. ' 6
Justice Scalia, perhaps surprisingly (but then perhaps not),
ignored the scholarship of the history of Article III. Instead, he
cavalierly stated that the injury requirement is an "irreducible
constitutional minimum, '  a "principle fundamental,"'  and a
82. JAFFE, supra note 15, at 466-67; see Berger, supra note 78, at 826-27; Winter,
supra note 79, at 1398-99.
83. Evan Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 345
(1989); see Martin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905) (noting that actions in which the
plaintiffs have "no interest whatever in the controversy other than that given by the
statute, have been in existence for hundreds of years in England, and in this country
ever since the foundation of our Government" and the right to recover is given to the
"first common informer who brings the action, although he has no interest in the matter
whatever except as such informer").
84. Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and
Article III, 91 MIcH. L. REV. 163, 177 (1992).
85. See Berger, supra note 78; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatiza-
tion of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1433 (1988) ("[T]here is in fact no basis
in [Article III] or in any other provision of the Constitution for the view that the private
law model is constitutional in status.").
86. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 120 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting, particular-
ly, qui tam actions such as Trout, 199 U.S. at 225).
87. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992).
88. Id. at 2145.
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"common understanding" '89 undergirding the exercise of judicial
power. In the substantive constitutional law context, Justice Scalia
has explained that traditions limiting the authority of the demo-
cratic branches of government may be discovered only by explor-
ing "the most specific level at which [the] relevant tradition...
can be identified."'  The reason for this closely cabined method-
ology is "to prevent generations from lightly casting aside impor-
tant traditional values-not to enable [the] Court to invent new
ones."91 Apparently, it takes far less to justify limiting the power
of Congress to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts than
to justify casting aside cherished values. On occasion, "new" tradi-
tions find a ready judicial home.
In his widely noted essay on interpretation, The Rule of Law
as a Law of Rules,' Justice Scalia advocated the framing of gen-
eral rules designed to bind both government actors and the courts.
There are necessary limits to this process, however, since
"the difficulty of framing general rules" arises not merely from
the inherent nature of the subject at issue, but from the imper-
fect scope of the materials that judges are permitted to consult.
Even where a particular area is quite susceptible of clear and
definite rules, we judges cannot create them out of whole cloth,
but must find some basis for them in the text that Congress or
the Constitution has provided.93
The Defenders opinion may not have been created from whole
cloth, but the source of its fabric is at least mysterious. As Justice
Scalia has said himself, "When one does not have a solid textual
anchor or an established social norm from which to derive the
general rule, its pronouncement appears uncomfortably like legisla-
tion."'94
89. Id. at 2136.
90. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 128 n.6 (1989) (justifying the historical
approach to determining the rights of natural fathers); see also Lee v. Weisman, 112 S.
CL 2649, 2679 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The line we must draw between the per-
missible and the impermissible is one which accords with history and faithfully reflects
the understanding of the Founding Fathers.") (quoting Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 294 (1963)).
91. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123 n.2.
92. 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
93. Id. at 1182-83 (quoting Aristotle, The Politics bk. III, ch. 11, in THE BASIC
WORKS OF ARIsToTLE 1192 (Richard McKeon ed. & Benjamin Jowett trans., 1941)).




Whether right or wrong, the Supreme Court has rooted its
Article IlI jurisprudence firmly in the soil-or perhaps the shifting
sands-of the particularized injury standard. 5 Just as the opinion
in Defenders emphasized the injury in fact requirement's status as
the "core component"'  and "essential"'  aspect of the case or
controversy standard, other recent decisions have characterized
injury as the "bedrock" principle of modem standing law." There
can be little doubt, therefore, as to the course the Court has cho-
sen. As the Court should have recognized in Defenders, however,
the injury standard is particularly ill-suited to provide a compre-
hensible barrier against the expansive use of statutory standing.
The reasons for the standard's weakness as a cabining tool lie
in the nature of the injury determination itself. The injury in fact
test was designed to simplify and liberalize the standing inquiry."
Layman's injury-harm "in fact"-rather than legal or "lawyer's"
injury, is the linchpin. This supposedly fact-based determination is
meant to be made separately from the claim on the merits. As
Justice Douglas recognized in Data Processing, "The 'legal interest'
test goes to the merits. The question of standing is different."' °
These twin goals of liberalization and objectivization, however,
are too weighty a burden for the injury standard to carry. Ana-
lyzing injury is, quite literally, a problem of philosophical dimen-
sion. To illustrate, compare the harms associated with the Hindu
doctrine of ahimsa 0 t and Nietzsche's claim that anything one
Scalia claims to adhere "to a more or less originalist theory of construction." Id. at 1184.
The Defenders opinion, however, makes no bow toward originalism. See generally Gene
R. Nichol, Jr., Bork's Dilemma, 76 VA. L. REV. 337 (1990) (arguing that one of the
main problems with originalist constitutional theory is that its proponents relentlessly
refuse to apply it in a consistent fashion).
95. See generally Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Injury and the Disintegration of Article 111, 74
CAL. L REV. 1915 (1986) (outlining generally the Supreme Court's commitment to the
injury requirement as the core Article III inquiry).
96. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992).
.97. Id. at 2145.
98. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982).
99. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53 (1970);
see also Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 153,
156-60 (1987).
100. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153.
101. Ahimsa is a minority Hindu doctrine requiring that one refrain from harming any
1154 [Vol. 42:1141
SCALIA AND STANDING
survives makes one stronger. This may sound extreme, obtuse, or
beside the point, but it is not. It is not helpful to speak merely of
concrete, direct, imminent, or actual harm.. The injury determina-
tion necessarily encompasses a further question: "Injury to what?"
William Fletcher has demonstrated the question-begging na-
ture of the injury calculus quite effectively with what he calls a
"homely" example:
Imagine two siblings who compare, as children will, the treatment
they receive from their parents. If one child receives a new bicy-
cle, the other may complain if he does not also receive a new
bicycle or some equivalent. A parent who has just bought a
bicycle for one child is likely to say ... to the complaining child,
"It doesn't hurt you that I got a bicycle for your sister." Of
course [that is] wrong .... The child is feeling hurt. What [we]
really mean or should mean ... is that the child should not feel
hurt; or that... [we] do not wish to recognize the feeling as a
hurt .... 102
Why is it that economic and aesthetic injuries are legally cogniza-
ble, whereas harms to a potential plaintiff's interest in, for exam-
ple, racial segregation or in remaining in the country undetected as
an illegal alien are not? The reason, of course, is that the injury
determination necessarily entails an exploration of what we wish to
recognize as harm. From its earliest applications of the legal inter-
est test, the Court has given hints that it understood the complexi-
ty of its venture, concluding in Sierra Club v. Morton 03 that the
standard "requires ... injury to a cognizable interest."" 4 "Cogni-
zable," in this sense, is an obviously loaded term. As Joseph
Vining has written, "in the very recognition of a 'person' who is
'harmed' courts ... cap the formulation of a value . . . , confirm
it in our language and our thought, and permit a ... search for
its realization to begin.
Examples of courts' reliance on their values in determining
whether a party has standing appear regularly. One group of plain-
living entity.
102. William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 231-32 (1988).
103. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
104. Id. at 734-35.




tiffs in Warth v. Seldin116 complained that the allegedly
exclusionary zoning ordinances challenged prevented them, as
residents of a particular community, from enjoying "the benefits of
living in a racially and ethnically integrated community."'1 7 The
Court concluded that, even if true, this lost interest did not con-
stitute injury."° Similarly, in Roe v. Wade," the Court denied
standing to challenge Texas's restrictive abortion statute to a mar-
ried couple who had been warned by physicians against both child-
birth and the use of certain contraceptives." Assuming that the
couple's asserted deprivation of "marital happiness" was a euphe-
mism for loss of sexual freedom and intimacy, the Court conclud-
ed that such a loss did not constitute Article III injury."'
Somehow, the Court deems these sorts of interests too ethere-
al or utopian (or whatever) to sustain judicial power. Occasionally,
however, the Court has rejected a proffered interest more overtly.
In cases like O'Shea v. Littleton,' Rizzo v. Goode,"3 and City
of Los Angeles v. Lyons,"4 the Court denied judicial interven-
tion, at least in part, because it reasoned that the plaintiffs would
be harmed by their respective defendants only if the plaintiffs
violated the law and again came into contact with police offi-
cials." 5 That likelihood was not one the Court was anxious to
embrace. More pointedly, in Burrafato v. United States Department
of State,"6 the Second Circuit denied standing to challenge State
Department regulations concerning the allocation of permanent
immigrant visas to an alien who had entered the country illegal-
106. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
107. Id. at 512; see Nichol, supra note 95, at 1930.
108. Warth, 422 U.s. at 513-14.
109. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
110. Id. at 128.
111. Id.
112. 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
113. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
114. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
115. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105-06 ("Lyons would have . . . to allege that he would have
another encounter with the police."); Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 370-73 (viewing the risk of
injury to plaintiffs from inadequate police procedures as too conjectural); O'Shea, 414
U.S. at 496 ("[H]ere the prospect of future injury rests on the likelihood that re-
spondents will again be arrested for and charged with violations of the criminal
law . . ").
116. 523 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976).
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ly."17 Although the plaintiff had a clear stake in the controversy,
the Second Circuit thought, correctly, that giving credence to his
claim would encourage illegal entry.' Determining whether a
plaintiff has suffered injury in fact is not, curiously, a straight-for-
ward factual inquiry. It is, rather, "based on [a] normative judg-
ment about what ought to constitute a judicially cognizable injury
in the particular context." 9
This "methodology" poses two difficulties for the analysis of
statutory standing. First, as the Court itself has long recog-
nized,"2 Congress creates legal interests-it does so every day, in
myriad ways, for a huge variety of reasons and to benefit a wide
array of persons. Creating legal interests, in fact, is what Congress
does for a living. When those interests, having been brought into
existence, are threatened or transgressed, the conclusion that the
interest-holder has been injured is unavoidable. As an initial mat-
ter, therefore, it is very hard to see how a statutory grant of
standing can be obliterated through the use of an injury calculus,
and it is difficult to perceive a justifiable constitutional limitation
on the sorts of interests Congress might create. That is why, until
Defenders, if a plaintiff came within the terms of a statutory grant
of standing, the injury in fact test was deemed to have been satis-
fied.
Second, the determination of injury, as I and others have
suggested,' 2' is amorphous, complex, and value-laden. If Congress
chooses to create a legally cognizable interest, the Court would
seem to have little basis, and even less authority, to disregard that
legislative choice. In my view, this is what Justice Stevens had in
mind in Defenders when he argued that the majority opinion
served to "demean"'" the interests Congress had tried to protect
in the Endangered Species Act. By imposing a judicially created
injury standard upon the authority of Congress to grant jurisdic-
tion-a standard which, on its own, can have no ascertainable
117. Id. at 555.
118. Id. at 557.
119. Fletcher, supra note 102, at 232.
120. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500-01, 509-10 (1975); Linda R.S. v. Richard
D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973).
121. VINING, supra note 105; Fletcher, supra note 102, at 221; Nichol, supra note 95,
at 1915.
122. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2148 (1992) (Stevens, J., concur-
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meaning-the power of the Court is significantly enhanced, not
diminished."
The difficulties presented by using injury to limit statutory
standing are reflected in Justice Scalia's explanation of the defi-
ciencies- in the Defenders plaintiff's jurisdictional claims. Prior
expansive statutory standing cases like Trafficante and Havens
Realty" had recognized de facto injuries that Scalia claimed
were "inadequate in law" until rendered judicially cognizable
through statutory enactment. 26 The assumption is, therefore, that
there exists a universe of de facto injuries that makes up the outer
boundaries of potential federal jurisdiction. If Congress chooses to
recognize these sorts of interests as bases for standing, Article III
is not compromised. If, however, Congress attempts-as it seem-
ingly did through the Endangered Species Act-to reach beyond
this pool, the case or controversy requirement poses an insur-
mountable barrier.
First, and curiously, the Scalia framework concedes that the
dichotomy between de facto and "legally cognizable" injuries poses
great difficulty for existing standing law. If there are de facto inju-
ries which are not legally cognizable, why is that so? I would as-
sume that by definition, the harms asserted do not fail the injury
in fact test. It also cannot be because the injuries are "indirect" or
"intangible," though these are the sorts of labels the Court usually
employs. Rather, it is because, at least when standing is not based
on a statutory or constitutional interest, the determination of inju-
ry is a normative enterprise.
Second, and perhaps more fundamentally, Justice Scalia's
category of de facto injuries lacks characteristics that distinguish
such injuries from harms that are not de facto injuries. The public
123. See Fletcher, supra note 102, at 233 (stating that the Court's insistence on an
injury in fact requirement springs from the Court's desire to avoid overdudicialization of
the legislative process).
124. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
125. In Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982), the Court recognized
statutory standing on the basis of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. One of the "testers" who
was granted standing conceded that he had no interest in actually obtaining housing in
the Richmond area in question. Rather, he was helping to construct a case of racial
steering. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court ruled that the tester's statutorily created right
to truthful information about housing availability had been transgressed-thus creating
injury. Id at 373-74. Under the Defenders methodology, however, the tester actually
would have nothing at stake.
126. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2145 (1992).
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law of the United States has changed dramatically in the last four
decades. Marbury v. Madison12 may indeed have reflected a be-
lief that "[t]he province of the court is, solely, to decide on the
rights of individuals,"'" but today, the federal courts regularly
entertain lawsuits based upon "intangible" and "generalized"
claims such as concern for the snail-darter; or saving the
whale;130 or the mathematical "dilution"-based on popula-
tion, race, or politics1--of the power of the vote; or the
"separationist" anxieties created by the federal government con-
tributing to the salaries of Catholic school teachers;M or a
plaintiff's representational interest in pursuing a claim for members
of a class.3 Almost contemporaneous with the Defenders deci-
sion, the Supreme Court concluded that the mere "perception" of
unfairness in- the criminal system"3 and the unthreatened specter
of reduction in property value 37 constitute injury in fact. The list
of "non-individualized, non-concrete actions" (if such things exist
outside the Article III context) is a long one."3 As Professor
Monaghan has recognized, "many rights may be held in common
as well as in gross.""3 Many of the modern federalism and sep-
127. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
128. Id. at 170.
129. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
130. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
131. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
132. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
133. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
134. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
135. United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980).
136. Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1371 (1991). Justice Scalia, it should be noted,
dissented in Powers.
137. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899-902 (1992).
138. Consider also: Consumer actions such as Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479
U.S. 388 (1987) and Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin.,
793 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1986); cases claiming non-statutory environmental injury such as
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978) and Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); and Voting Rights Act cases such as Thornburg v. Gingles,
478 U.S. 30 (1986).
139. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE
LJ. 1363, 1370 (1973). See generalry Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L.
REv. 227 (1990) ("[U]nstated acceptance of private rights model leads to a refusal to
recognize ... collective rights and collective harms."); Martin H. Redish, The Passive
Virtues, The Counter-Majoritarian Principle, and the Judicial-Political Model of Constitu-
tional Adjudication, 22 CONN. L. REV. 647 (1990) (arguing that the particularized injury
standard is an inappropriate limitation on the power of judicial review).
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aration of powers cases are not disputes over individual rights in
Marbury's sense." More importantly, if all of these cases repre-
sent de facto injuries, as Justice Scalia uses the term, then surely
the concept does not mean very much; perhaps, it does not mean
anything at all. More likely, the statement that a plaintiff is in-
jured is a normative one based on factors extraneous to the mea-
surement of harm. Put that way, a court is on quite shaky
ground when it disagrees with a congressional assertion of
standing.
V. LIMITING CONGRESS THROUGH THE INJURY REQUIREMENT
I have argued above that the injury in fact standard is incapa-
ble of providing a comprehensible and ingenuous limitation on the
power of Congress to grant standing. The injury determination is,
necessarily, value-laden--drawing upon both legal norms and social
acceptance of the sorts of claims asserted. Yet, the uncontestable
power of Congress to create legal interests capable of incursion,
and the legislative branch's constitutional authority to regulate the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, create an insurmountable set of
barriers to the use of this malleable injury standard to cabin Con-
gress. In my view, therefore, Justice Scalia and his colleagues inap-
propriately limited statutory standing in Defenders.
This claim, it should be said, is more limited than that made
by Professor Cass Sunstein in response to Defenders."' Sunstein
argues that the injury in fact standard inappropriately "defines
modern public law by reference to common law principles." '
Accordingly, Sunstein advocates scrapping the standard that has
served as our jurisdictional cornerstone for over two decades:
Whether an injury is cognizable ... should not depend on its
familiarity or its common law pedigree; this approach [represents]
a conspicuous reintroduction of Lochner-era notions of substan-
140. See, eg., Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789 (1992); National League of Cities
v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1985); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). Cases like
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), and INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), begin
as individual rights cases, but on the merits they measure the interests of one institution
against the another. In a true private rights model, these cases would be dismissed under
the third-party standing rule.
141. Fletcher, supra note 102, at 231-32.
142. Sunstein, supra note 84.
143. Id. at 187.
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tive due process. Whether an injury is cognizable should depend
on what the legislature has said ... or on the definitions of inju-
ry provided in the various relevant sources of positive law. The
Court should abandon the metaphysics of injury in fact. It should
return to the question whether a cause of action has been con-
ferred on the plaintiff.'"
There is much truth in Sunstein's claim. When used to thwart
expressed congressional will, the injury test's dangers are real. In
my view, however, these dangers should not deny injury in fact's
"metaphysics" a place in the law of federal courts.
It is no doubt attractive to return the standing inquiry "to the
question whether a cause of action has been conferred on the
plaintiff."45 Much standing law is no less circular than it was in
the days of the much-chastised legal interest test,'46 and the
injury in fact standard often masks what is a complex and clearly
normative undertaking. It is also true that focusing on cause of
action analysis frequently does not resolve the difficult questions
of standing law; it merely postpones them. Administrative Proce-
dure Act cases like Data Processing can be most successfully han-
dled by interpreting the "adversely affected" language of the stat-
ute and, of course, the legal norms on which the plaintiff re-
lies.1 47
If we move beyond the confines of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act to, for example, section 1983 cases, familiar problems
reappear. In Linda R.S. v. Richard D.'" and Warth v. Seldin,49
for example, plaintiffs lodged equality challenges against state and
local government practices. The contested governmental practices,
however, primarily regulated the activities of third parties rather
than the plaintiffs. Does the Equal Protection Clause create a legal
claim in such instances? What of challenges to essentially non-
regulatory government behavior? Think, for example, of the fol-
144. Id. at 191.
145. This argument is made powerfully in Fletcher, supra note 102, at 228-39.
146. See generally VINING, supra note 105, at 39-45 (applauding the demise of the
legal interest standard).
147. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988) C'A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action,
or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.").
148. 410 U.S. 614 (1973) (challenging allegedly discriminatory application of state child
support provision).
149. 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (challenging allegedly exclusionary local zoning ordinances).
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lowing claims: That Justice Black had been appointed to the Su-
preme Court in violation of the Emoluments Clause;1 0 that a
municipality's Christmas creche is prohibited by the First Amend-
ment;Sl that a public subsidy for private segregated schools is a
deprivation of equal protection;15 2 that the CIA must publish its
budget;153  that congressmen can't serve in the executive
branch;"s or that congressional pay raises must be accomplished
through explicit legislation."5
Faced with these sorts of jurisdictional claims, it is perhaps
not surprising that the Court would turn to an overarching con-
cept-a rule that would attempt to define the breadth of the cog-
nizable causes of action for more than one constitutional provision
at a time. It might even be that if Professor Sunstein were himself
to cast a reasonable approach to such an array of lawsuits, under
the rubric of the examination of available causes of action, he
would look to what the plaintiff has at stake beyond the bare
asserted constitutional violation and to whether each member of
the populace, or only some specially affected subset, can stand as
plaintiff. Fundamentally, of course, these are the focal points of
the injury in fact test. And they are hardly illegitimate inquiries
for a court attempting to measure judicial authority. The problem,
rather, is that the Constitution is, and probably should remain,
silent on such issues. 5 So the Supreme Court, despite Justice
Scalia's efforts, is in no position to impose its vision of permissible
public law litigation upon Congress.
150. Ex parte Ivitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937) (arguing that the appointment violated U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2, which provides that no senator or representative shall be ap-
pointed to a civil office which was either created or the emoluments of which were in-
creased during the senator's or representative's period in office).
151. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); see also Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388
(1983) (challenging to state tax deduction for "tuition, textbooks, and transportation"
expenses for education of children in sectarian primary and secondary schools).
152. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S.
455 (1973).
153. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
154. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
.155. Richardson v. Kennedy, 313 F. Supp. 1282 (W.D. Pa. 1970), afl'd, 401 U.S. 901
(1971).
156. This means, of course, that the injury test should not be seen as a constitutional
mandate. See generally Evan T. Lee, Deconslitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of
Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REv. 605 (1992); Nichol, supra note 99.
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VI. THE UNHELPFUL TURN TO ARTICLE II
In denying plaintiffs standing under Article III, the Defenders
opinion also placed extraordinary reliance on the demands of Arti-
cle II. While casting aside the statutory standing claim, Justice
Scalia indicated that Congress had no power to turn the "undiffer-
entiated public interest in executive officers' compliance with the
law into an 'individual right' vindicable in the courts."1 7 To
allow Congress to wield such power would "transfer from the
President to the courts the Chief Executive's most important con-
stitutional duty, to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully execut-
ed."" 5  Although the Court in Defenders held that the use of
the provisions of the Act to provide standing violated Article III
as applied, it thought that the "take Care" clause added significant
further justification to the result. 59
The Court's turn to Article II analysis is perplexing. On the
one hand, it does seem broadly consistent with Justice Scalia's
general vision of executive authority. As he wrote in dissent in
Morrison v. Olson,"6 the "inexorable command of Article II is
clear" that "the executive power must be vested in the President
of the United States."'' Accordingly, the mixture of citizen and
judicial enforcement set forth in the Endangered Species Act-to
demand consultation at the request of "any person"-
impermissibly intrudes upon executive prerogative.
On the other hand, Scalias position in Morrison was uttered
in dissent, and a lonely one at that. 62 Moreover, separation of
powers analysis focuses on one branch of government's degree of
intrusion on the constitutional authority of another, or on the
extent to which the challenged actions consolidate powers that
should properly be shared.63 Without being boneheaded about
it, under this inquiry a challenged legislative or judicial action
either unconstitutionally abrogates executive power or it does not.
157. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2145 (1992).
158. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
159. See The Supreme Court-1991 Term, 106 HARV. L. REv. 163, 308-18 (1992).
160. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
161. Id. at 697, 710 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
162. Justice Scalia was the sole dissenter in Morrison.




It should make little difference what sort of plaintiff seeks to
trigger the incursion.
The Endangered Species Act requires interagency consultation
when government acts threaten certain species. If the agency fails
to follow this procedure, "any person" can seek judicial interven-
tion to force consultation. Does this scheme, when initiated by an
"undifferentiated" member of the public, usurp executive authori-
ty? Consider three examples where the Court's standing criteria
would be met.
First, imagine a plaintiff who clearly does have standing-for
example, an American professor of zoology presently attempting to
study the Nile crocodile in Egypt-who challenges the governmen-
tal actions involved in Defenders. If a court were to order con-
sultation in a suit brought by the zoologist, would the intrusion on
executive authority be any less than that contemplated by the De-
fenders plaintiffs?
Second, imagine that the Act were amended to include the
following provision:
The interagency consultation process described herein is designed
to reduce the threatened harm to endangered species in the
United States and around the world. All persons have a legally
cognizable interest in reducing potential threats to the survival of
endangered species. The consultation requirement is explicitly
applicable to U.S. government-funded projects developed in for-
eign countries. Any person, whether or not otherwise harmed by
the challenged government action, may enforce the consultation
procedures required by the Act in federal court.
At least two members of the Defenders majority, Justices Kennedy
and Souter, suggest that standing would be acceptable under such
a statute.1" In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy opined that
"Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of
causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none
existed before . . . ."'6 If a plaintiff were to file an action simi-
lar to Defenders on the strength of such a statutory amendment,
standing would apparently exist, but would the threat to the
164. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2146-47 (1992) (Kennedy and
Souter, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). When added to the





executive's Article II powers be any greater or any less than that
rejected in Defenders?1"
Finally, what if the Act were amended to allow a $50
"bounty" for any plaintiff who is successful in enforcing the con-
sultation requirement?16 Money is the "personal stake" that we
understand best in the United States. This easy (and cheap) move
would bring the suit clearly within the qui tam tradition and, one
assumes, safely under the umbrella of the case or controversy re-
quirement." The federal courts, therefore, would entertain the
action brought in Defenders if a bounty were attached to the
claim; is the incursion upon executive authority somehow dimin-
ished?
My point, now perhaps beleaguered, is that the "personal
stake" a plaintiff brings to a suit challenging executive action is a
question quite analytically distinct from the separation of powers
determination. The nature and extent of the plaintiff's injury tells
us very little about the scope of presidential power. A plaintiff
with a demonstrably concrete and personalized injury may seek
relief which intrudes fundamentally upon the executive do-
main."6 A plaintiff with only a "citizen's interest" in executive
compliance, on the other hand, may pose no meaningful threat to
executive authority. It can hardly be the case that the same exer-
cise of judicial power which violates executive authority if request-
ed in a statutory citizen suit is constitutionally permissible if a
bounty or imminent zoological interest provides the basis for juris-
diction. Justice Scalia's apparent effort to conflate the two inqui-
ries serves neither Article II nor Article III admirably.
VII. STANDING AND PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION
It is not likely that Justice Scalia raised the barriers of the
case or controversy requirement merely to limit the geographical
166. Of course, the inconsistency illustrated by this example is with the Defenders
majority's position. Justice Scalia, who did not join Justice Kennedy's concurrence, might
well regard the statute in this example as a violation of Article III.
167. Professor Sunstein has suggested this alternative as a congressional response to
Defenders. Sunstein, supra note 84, at 223-24.
168. See generally Caminker, supra note 83 (discussing the constitutionality of qui tam
actions).
169. See Mora v. McNamara, 387 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 934
(1967) (challenge to Vietnam War).
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confines of the Endangered Species Act. After all, the Court could
have accomplished that task by reaching the merits and deciding
against the plaintiffs. It seems more plausible that the Defenders
decision, along with Justice Scalia's 1990 opinion in Lujan v. Na-
tional Wildlife Federation,70 is part of a broader agenda.
In 1976, Professor Abraham Chayes wrote a now-classic article
entitled The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation.17' Draw-
ing upon the characteristics of then newly recognized "public" ac-
tions-cases desegregating schools, supervising the operation of
prisons, challenging environmental degradation, attacking regulato-
ry programs, and the like-Chayes contrasted the traditional "pri-
vate rights" model of adjudication with what he called public law
litigation. Traditionally, lawsuits arose from disputes between pri-
vate parties about private rights. These actions were bipolar, retro-
spective, party-controlled, and self-contained.'72 The judge played
the role of a neutral umpire. The goal was compensation for past
harm. The standing question "could hardly arise" under this essen-
tially common law model, since the plaintiff's authority to sue was
merged with the validity of the merits of the claim. 73
The "new" public law litigation did not look or act this way.
Most frequently, these lawsuits sought the vindication of constitu-
tional or statutory interests, not a private, common law right. The
relief sought might affect many people and diverse concerns. "The,
argument [was] about whether or how a government policy or
program shall be carried out."'74 Therefore, the liability determi-
nation and the relief imposed were, to some extent, predictions of
what was likely to occur in the future. The decree was designed to
alter future behavior, not to pay for prior wrongs. This new mod-
el, as Professor Chayes described it, "reflects and relates to a
regulatory system where ... arrangements are the product of
positive enactment. In such a system, enforcement ... is necessari-
ly implementation of regulatory policy."'75
At the same time that Chayes published his essay, the Su-
preme Court was beginning to construct the injury, causation, and
170. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
171. 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1976).
172. Id. at 1282-85.
173. Id. at 1290.
174. Id. at 1295.
175. Id. at 1304.
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redressability trilogy that now constitutes the foundation of mod-
em standing law.'76 Not only did the Court require injury "in
fact," it also demanded that the harm be "distinct" and "tangible."
It made causation, an obvious corollary of the injury standard, a
more rigorous hurdle-seemingly reversing normal pleading pre-
sumptions and measuring causal links with skepticism.'77 The
redressability standard also took a shot in the arm. The Court
made it more difficult for beneficiaries of government regulation
to pursue lawsuits, because the benefits of affirmative relief were
often indirect or contingent. Then, in the early 1980s, Justice
Scalia began his personal crusade to markedly strengthen
standing's curb on an "overjudicialized" government.
The tensions between the public litigation model and the
bolstered standing requirements of the last two decades are clear
and direct. Disputes about public policies frequently implicate new
sorts of citizen interests-interests for which there are no clear
counterparts at common law. These diverse concerns can be char-
acterized as intangible, abstract non-injuries. Because public actions
often seek systemic rather than localized changes, the interests as-
serted also can be described as general and non-distinct. The cau-
sation and redressability standards hit directly at the predictive and
probabilistic nature of the public action. If a suit is designed to
alter future government behavior, the effects of the desired chang-
es may well be speculative and uncertain.
Now, the Court has directed the apparent juggernaut of the
particularized injury standard toward the power of Congress as
well. Justice Scalia's assault on broad-based statutory standing
claims may not end with the Endangered Species Act. In his Suf-
folk University Law Review essay, he argued that even "concrete"
statutorily created interests might not "suffice to mark out a sub-
group of the body politic requiring judicial protection."'78 As an
appellate judge, he wrote that widely shared statutory claims are
"of interest only to the society at large, and should be resolved
through the political mechanisms by which ... society acts."' 79
176. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
177. See Nichol, supra note 32.
178. Scalia, supra note 16, at 881.
179. Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 793 F.2d
1322, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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This cabining theory may reach well beyond the admittedly tempt-
ing "any person" language of the Act. It is not difficult to con-
struct a significant list of modem standing decisions which could
fall if generalized actions are ruled beyond the federal judicial
power.'"
It is also ironic that these moves may be accomplished under
an umbrella of judicial restraint and concern for the appropriate
separation of powers. The Defenders opinion speaks so frequently
and so eloquently of the need to avoid judicial enforcement of the
"public interest" that the reader is tempted to forget that it is an
aspect of a statute passed by the U.S. Congress-designed to fos-
ter the express policy of species conservation-that the Court
effectively has declared unconstitutional. The statute apparently
ran afoul of the "common understandings" that Justice Scalia
senses about judicial power. The notion that the Justices' view of
the appropriate, traditional role of a branch of government might
limit federal congressional authority is not new to constitutional
jurisprudence, but it has had a troubled history.' Justice Scalia's
view of separation of powers threatens to constitutionalize an un-
balanced scheme of regulatory review. As courts whittle away the
public litigation model, regulatory incentives become skewed.'1
The courts can protect the interests of regulated entities, but the
interests of" "regulatory beneficiaries""1 3 are left to the political
process. If the workings of American government are indeed
"overjudicialized," it would seem more sensible, and more direct,
to craft increasingly deferential standards of review on the merits
rather than to completely bar Congress from recognizing certain
interests.
In fairness, it is true that public law litigation has been, funda-
mentally, the child of the courts. The judiciary itself initiated the
180. E.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n,
479 U.S. 388 (1987); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) (discussed
supra note 125); United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980); Glad-
stone, Realtors v. Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979); United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669
(1973); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972); Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962); Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 793 F.2d
1322 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Scenic Hudson v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
181. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873 (1987).
182. See Sunstein, supra note 85, at 1433-38.
183. Id. at 1433.
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major changes highlighted by Professor Chayes over fifteen years
ago. What the Court gives, it can, in almost every sense, take
away. Yet nothing in the Constitution demands a private rights
model of adjudication-not its language, not its history, not its
structure, and not the standards fashioned to measure access. The
U.S. Supreme Court should not pretend otherwise, even to repudi-
ate its past.
